By Sherzad MamSani
President of the Israel–Kurdistan Alliance Network
EastMed Strategic Studies Institute contributor
Between the mismanagement of American alliances and internal Kurdish division, a rare opportunity to open a strategic front against Iran was lost—turning Kurdistan from a potential regional player into a contested arena of influence.
At a moment that could have changed the balance of power in the Middle East, Kurdistan was not merely a geographic region between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. It was a rare strategic opportunity: a natural front against the Iranian regime, and a historic base for national Kurdish forces in Eastern Kurdistan that have resisted Tehran for decades.
But that opportunity never became reality. It was obstructed by Washington’s mistakes, Tom Barrack’s calculations, Turkish pressure, Iranian influence, and the role of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah under Bafel Talabani.
The Kurds did not fail because they were weak.
They failed because the national Kurdish decision was restricted, redirected, and besieged from within and without.
First: An American Admission of Failure—But Too Late
The problem does not begin with Kurdistan alone, but with America’s long failure in Iraq. Tom Barrack was reported as saying that American failure in Iraq helped create a vacuum that Iran filled. This admission is dangerous because it does not merely describe the past; it also explains the present. Whenever Washington withdraws from managing the real balance of power, Tehran advances to fill the vacuum. Kurdistan24 published a report on Barrack’s remarks, in which he described Iraq as a massive political failure that empowered Iran, while Arabic reports pointed to the same substance.
Here the central question emerges:
If Washington knows that Iran fills vacuums, why does it still deal with Kurdish political channels accused of moving closer to Tehran?
Tom Barrack’s mistake does not lie only in his statements, but in the way he manages files. He speaks about America’s failure in Iraq, while at the same time moving inside Iraq and Kurdistan through networks and channels that may be part of the problem rather than the solution.
Second: The Kurdish Opportunity Against Iran Was Real
Talk of a Kurdish role against Iran was not political fantasy. Multiple reports indicated that the Trump administration seriously explored the possibility of using Iranian Kurdish opposition forces against the Iranian regime.
Reuters reported on March 4, 2026, that Iranian Kurdish militias had consulted with the United States about the possibility of attacking Iranian security forces in western Iran, and that American military support was part of the discussion. Reuters later reported that Trump’s contradictory messages and Iran’s strikes on Kurdish sites kept the Kurds out of the war.
The Washington Post also reported that Trump contacted Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish leaders, offered air cover and logistical support, and asked Kurdish parties in Southern Kurdistan not to obstruct the movement of Iranian Kurdish groups.
These facts mean that the idea existed: opening a front inside Iran through national Kurdish forces in Eastern Kurdistan.
Here, a clear distinction must be made: national, non-leftist Kurdish forces—especially those rooted in the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination—are not tools for anyone. They are not mercenaries, and they are not a card in the hands of Washington or Tel Aviv. They represent a legitimate national cause against a repressive Iranian regime that occupies Eastern Kurdistan, bombs opposition headquarters, hunts activists, and executes Kurdish youth.
Defending these parties is a defense of the Kurds’ right to life and freedom. It is not a defense of a reckless war.
Third: Israel Saw the Opportunity—and Turkey Moved to Shut It Down
From an Israeli perspective, a potential Kurdish role against Iran made perfect strategic sense. Iran surrounds Israel through its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The Kurds of Eastern Kurdistan represent an internal pressure point against the Iranian regime.
Ynet reported that Turkey had blocked an alleged plan to recruit Kurdish fighters for operations inside Iran, and that around 500 Kurdish fighters were on their way from Iraq toward Iran before Ankara intervened. The report also indicated that Israel, in coordination with the United States, sought to activate Kurdish groups in Iraq and inside Iran as proxy ground forces within a broader campaign against Iran.
More seriously, the same report stated that Ankara contacted the Kurdistan Region’s leadership, warned the Barzani and Talabani families, and that Erdoğan raised the matter with Trump, opposing the use of Kurdish forces in the conflict.
Here the truth becomes clear:
Turkey does not fear Iran as much as it fears the rise of the Kurds.
Ankara does not want strong Kurds in Southern Kurdistan, Eastern Kurdistan, or Western Kurdistan. It prefers the Kurds divided, politically disarmed, and trapped between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.
Fourth: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—From Kurdish Party to Iranian Channel of Influence?
At this sensitive moment, Sulaymaniyah should have been the center of an independent national Kurdish decision. Instead, the opposite happened.
Rudaw reported that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan said Trump clarified Washington’s objectives in the war against Iran during a call with Bafel Talabani. The report stated that Bafel told the PUK Politburo that the call provided a better understanding of U.S. objectives, and it also noted that Trump had contacted Mustafa Hijri, the leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.
This means that Bafel Talabani was at the center of communications related to the Iranian file. But the question is not whether he received a call. The question is: what did he do with that role?
If Kurdish parties in Southern Kurdistan were expected to open the path and not obstruct Iranian Kurdish groups, why did this moment not become an organized Kurdish national movement? Why did the opportunity end in paralysis?
This criticism does not target Sulaymaniyah as a beloved Kurdish city, nor the PUK’s social base as a Kurdish community. It targets a political leadership that turned a sensitive Kurdish position into a gray zone between Washington and Tehran.
Fifth: Bafel’s Congratulations to Iran’s Leadership—A Political Message That Cannot Be Ignored
On March 10, 2026, Anadolu Agency reported that Bafel Talabani congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei on being chosen as Iran’s new Supreme Leader, expressing hope that the step would contribute to easing tensions and strengthening stability and peace in the region.
This is not merely ordinary diplomatic protocol. In the context of an American-Israeli war against Iran, Iranian strikes on Kurdish sites, and a moment when Iranian Kurds were awaiting political and military support, such congratulations become a political signal.
The question is:
How can a Kurdish leadership congratulate the head of a regime that represses Eastern Kurdistan and bombs Kurdish opposition headquarters?
One cannot defend Kurdistan while sending reassurance signals to Tehran.
And one cannot speak of stability while Iran uses missiles and drones against the Kurds.
Sixth: The Meeting Between Tom Barrack and Bafel Talabani in Sulaymaniyah
The Arabic edition of ANF published a report about Bafel Talabani receiving Tom Barrack in Sulaymaniyah. Even if one takes into account that ANF has its own political position and is close to the PKK environment, the report is important because it confirms the existence of a direct communication channel between Barrack and Bafel at an extremely sensitive regional moment.
Here, Barrack’s mistake becomes clear:
Instead of building balance among national Kurdish forces, and instead of ensuring that support reached anti-Iranian forces, he chose to move through channels surrounded by serious political suspicion.
It is a fatal strategic mistake:
If you want to confront Iran, do not rely on a party accused of moving closer to Iran.
If you want to support Eastern Kurdistan, do not place the decision in the hands of those who fear Tehran’s anger or benefit from their relationship with it.
Seventh: The Mystery of American Weapons—A Serious Accusation That Requires Investigation
One of the most dangerous elements to emerge in political and media debate is what circulated on X through platforms linked to the Israeli security environment, including accounts using the name Mossad Commentary. These platforms claimed that American weapons sent through Kurdish channels to support the Iranian opposition did not reach the intended forces, and may instead have been diverted into networks of influence connected to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Bafel Talabani.
This must be stated clearly: these claims have not yet been officially confirmed by any American or Israeli government body. Therefore, they cannot be presented as a final judicial fact.
But analytically, they cannot be ignored, because they intersect with three documented facts:
First, there were real American contacts with Kurdish forces regarding Iran.
Second, the Kurds did not enter the war despite the fact that the idea was on the table.
Third, Iran and Turkey exerted pressure to prevent the activation of the Kurdish front.
If the claims of weapons diversion prove true, then this would not be a simple administrative error. It would be a dangerous strategic deviation: weapons intended for Iran’s opposition becoming a tool in an internal Kurdish power game—or being prevented from reaching those who were supposed to use them against the Iranian regime.
This opens a larger question:
Did Washington know who it was dealing with?
Or were its channels in Kurdistan politically compromised from the beginning?
Eighth: Iran Did Not Wait—It Struck the Kurds to Send a Message
Iran quickly understood the danger of the Kurdish card. It therefore did not wait for the idea to become a military front. Reports pointed to Iranian attacks on Kurdish sites inside the Kurdistan Region, and to the fact that Iranian shelling and security pressure were among the reasons the Kurds stayed out of the war. Reuters said that Iran’s strikes and Trump’s contradictory messages kept the Kurds out of the war, while Ynet reported that Iran targeted armed Kurdish groups inside Iraq and U.S. bases in the region, warning against any hostile deployment near its borders.
These were not merely military strikes. They were a political message:
Any Kurd who moves against Iran will pay the price.
But the painful question remains:
Where was the unified Kurdish response?
Where was the national position?
Where was the leadership prepared to say that the blood of the Kurds of Eastern Kurdistan is not cheap?
Ninth: Kirkuk—The Other Face of the Failure
This file cannot be separated from Kirkuk. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which is supposed to be a Kurdish party, became involved in political arrangements that weakened the Kurdish national position in Kirkuk and opened the door for Turkmen and Arab forces aligned with Turkey, Baghdad, or Iran at the expense of the Kurds’ historic right to the city.
Kirkuk is not an ordinary province.
Kirkuk is the heart of Southern Kurdistan, a symbol of Kurdish national memory, and the wound of Anfal, Arabization, and Baathist occupation.
Any Kurdish party that bargains over Kirkuk for partisan gains, or hands its keys to non-Kurdish forces connected to regional axes, is not merely making a political mistake. It is stabbing the Kurdish national conscience.
Here the same pattern repeats itself:
In Eastern Kurdistan, the front against Iran is disabled.
In Southern Kurdistan, Kirkuk is weakened.
The result is one: the retreat of the Kurdish national project in favor of Iran and Turkey.
Tenth: Defending the National Kurdish Parties of Eastern Kurdistan
It is necessary here to clearly defend the national, non-leftist Kurdish parties of Eastern Kurdistan—especially those that carry a clear national project against Iranian occupation.
These parties are not merely armed factions. They are an extension of the suffering of a people living under national, cultural, and security repression. Iran does not persecute them only because they are a security threat, but because it fears the very idea of Kurdistan.
Iran fears the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, national Kurdish forces such as PAK, and others because it understands that the Kurdish question is not a marginal issue inside Iran. It is a gateway to dismantling the Persian-Shiite imperial project built by the Revolutionary Guard.
For this reason, any obstruction of support reaching these forces is not a neutral position.
It is a direct service to Tehran.
Eleventh: Tom Barrack—Managing the Crisis or Managing Defeat?
Tom Barrack represents a recurring American pattern in the Middle East: admitting failure, then repeating the same tools that produced failure.
He sees that Iran filled the vacuum in Iraq, yet he operates in an Iraqi and Kurdish environment filled with Iranian influence. He criticizes American failure, yet he offers no real guarantees to protect allies. He speaks of partnerships, yet chooses channels whose independence is questionable.
Instead of Kurdistan becoming a strategic partner, it became a testing ground for Washington’s hesitation.
America’s greatest mistake in dealing with the Kurds is viewing them as a temporary instrument. America used the Kurds against ISIS, then left them facing Turkey. It tried to use the Kurds against Iran, but did not build a real protective umbrella for them. Every time, the Kurds pay the price.
The message must therefore be clear:
The Kurds are not mercenaries in other people’s wars.
The Kurds are a nation with a cause. Whoever wants to ally with them must recognize their national rights—not use them and then abandon them.
Twelfth: Between Washington, Tehran, and Ankara—Who Pays the Price?
Washington made mistakes.
Tehran exploited them.
Ankara obstructed.
And some Kurdish leaders bargained.
But who paid the price?
The Kurdish people, Israel’s strategy, and the Trump administration.
In Southern Kurdistan, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk are used as arenas of influence.
In Eastern Kurdistan, the opposition is bombed and besieged.
In the west, the Kurdish card is used in the game of Turkey, Russia, America, and Iran.
This is the essence of the historical betrayal:
It is not only that the world abandoned the Kurds.
It is that some Kurds helped the world marginalize their own cause.
Thirteenth: Was There a Secret Deal?
The timing of visits and movements by figures such as Tom Barrack and Esmail Qaani to Baghdad opens the door to questions. There is no public, decisive evidence of a specific secret deal, but since 2003 Iraq has been a battlefield of undeclared understandings as much as it has been a battlefield of declared conflict.
The most realistic analysis is that Washington and Tehran do not always need a written deal. Sometimes it is enough for each side to manage its red lines, for Baghdad to remain a space for exchanging messages, and for Kurdistan to be pushed to the margins of a larger game.
That alone is dangerous. Managing the conflict without resolving it means Iran will continue to expand, Turkey will continue to obstruct, and the Kurds will continue to pay the price.
Conclusion: Kurdistan Was Not Defeated—It Was Restrained
What happened was not merely an American mistake.
Nor was it merely Iranian pressure.
Nor was it merely Kurdish hesitation.
It was the convergence of three deadly factors:
1. American mismanagement of alliances.
2. Deep Iranian influence inside Iraq and Southern Kurdistan.
3. Kurdish leaders who placed partisan calculations above national destiny.
Kurdistan could have been a strategic front against Iran.
It could have been a natural ally of Israel and the West.
It could have supported Eastern Kurdistan at a historic moment.
But the opportunity was lost.
Not because the Kurdish people lacked courage, but because the political decision was restrained.
Not because the national parties in Eastern Kurdistan were unprepared, but because the path to them was blocked or disrupted.
Not because Iran was strong, but because its opponents acted with weakness, hesitation, and division.
Kurdistan was not defeated in battle.
Kurdistan was prevented from entering it.
And this is where the real betrayal begins.
Sources:
This article is based on reports and analyses published by Reuters, The Washington Post, Ynetnews, Rudaw, Anadolu Agency, ANF, Kurdistan24, and analytical reports circulated on X. Some allegations related to the diversion of weapons have not been officially confirmed; therefore, they are presented here as claims and analyses requiring independent investigation, not as final judicial conclusions.