Sherzad MamSani, EastMed Strategic Studies Institute contributor
Across the Middle East, various political factions are cooperating in unprecedented ways since the limited democratic openings of the early 1990s. Although few of these openings have resulted in lasting democratization, groups that had never worked together—and in some cases had long histories of rivalry—are now routinely cooperating in a broad range of political activities. Beyond parliamentary opposition blocs, cooperation has emerged within professional syndicates, in organizing protest activities, and in special forums for discussing constitutional amendments or drafting national charters. Most notably, many Islamic groups are now routinely cooperating with a range of leftist actors, including liberals, communists, and socialists.
Authoritarian regimes remain the primary obstacle to democratic reform in the Arab world, but even limited and strategic openings have led to new forms of political competition. Do these new practices have long-term implications for democratic transformation in the region? To address this question, our report explores Islamic–leftist cooperation in the Middle East. Applying a typology of three forms of cooperation—tactical, strategic, and intellectual—we examine three prominent cases of ideological collaboration in the region and find high levels of low-level cooperation, growing medium-level cooperation, but limited evidence of emerging high-level cooperation.
Levels of Cooperation
Tactical cooperation, the lowest level, occurs when groups engage in joint activities on an issue-by-issue, short-term basis. While repeated cooperation is possible, it typically happens only when actors adopt a shared discourse—such as support for Palestinians—with little political cost. Tactical cooperation does not require groups to justify their collaboration through their core ideological commitments.
Strategic cooperation is more sustainable and encompasses multiple issues. It may begin around a specific set of goals but can expand as new issues arise. Still, strategic cooperation may only be possible when certain topics remain off-limits. Groups agree to work together sustainably but without crafting a joint ideological or political vision.
High-level cooperation occurs when groups remain separate entities but strive to develop a collective vision for political, social, and economic reform. Participants are open to exploring any emerging issue, and ideological positions are shaped through substantive debate over core ideological commitments. This level of cooperation also involves broader questions of identity, where participants declare their commitment to a shared worldview as well as specific policies for achieving it.
The cases of Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen reveal increasing levels of Islamic–leftist cooperation under varying political contexts, along with ongoing obstacles to high-level collaboration.
Egypt
Egypt has a history of cross-ideological cooperation, but the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections witnessed an unprecedented level of collaboration across party, regional, and class lines, calling for Mubarak’s removal and the adoption of a new constitution. The political protests reflected such shared themes that the ideological commitments of individual organizers were often indistinguishable. Still, despite some instances of high-level cooperation, Islamist-leftist collaboration in Egypt remains primarily tactical and strategic.
Within the Muslim Brotherhood, a younger generation sought ways for the banned organization to gain a larger political voice in parliament. In 1984, the Brotherhood formed a tactical electoral alliance with the centrist Wafd Party, followed in 1987 by an alliance with the Labor Party—one that has formally endured. Though these alliances appeared ongoing, they proved largely tactical. In fact, the Brotherhood has been accused of infiltrating the Labor Party more than cooperating with it, with the goal of Islamizing the party.
When Mubarak closed off the political system in the early 1990s in response to renewed violence by Islamist militants, leaders from various political camps opposed the new harsh election laws, the cancellation of local university and mayoral elections, and tighter press controls. Like in other countries, political opposition found new spaces for activity. The Brotherhood soon controlled the majority of elected positions in many professional syndicates and organized protests on broader political issues, attracting activists from across the political spectrum.
In the late 1990s, there was intermittent cooperation between leftist civil society organizations at the grassroots level. The outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 attracted Islamist activists and wide public engagement. Protests intensified with the Iraq war, culminating in a major demonstration in Cairo on March 20, 2003. This surge of activism led to the formation of joint initiatives, raising the question of whether the Brotherhood was moving toward more consistent strategic cooperation. Notable initiatives included the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group (formed in 2002, joined by Islamists in 2003) and the “Kifaya” opposition movement, founded by seven friends from Islamic, Marxist, Nasserist, and liberal backgrounds. However, participants avoided contentious issues in the name of unity, and the cooperation did not reach a high level.
The number and diversity of multi-ideological organizations and forums reflect deep and growing frustration with the Egyptian status quo across the political spectrum. In 2005, Al-Wasat Party, Kifaya, the Karama Party (a Nasserist offshoot), and other opposition parties announced the formation of the National Front for Change, pledging to coordinate parliamentary candidates to challenge the ruling National Democratic Party in the fall elections. The Brotherhood’s participation in joint activities remains mostly at the tactical and strategic levels, although it regularly communicates with other parties. It joined the National Front for Change in 2005 only symbolically, emphasizing that it would not coordinate on candidates or slogans. As with many political actors, the Brotherhood attempts to operate on all fronts—maintaining collaborative ties with the regime while also engaging with opposition groups and candidates on other occasions.
Jordan
Islamist-leftist cooperation in Jordan has grown since the 1989 political opening, which led to the resumption of national elections and the lifting of martial law the following year. Tactical cooperation first emerged during protests against the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991. By 1992, leaders of the newly formed Islamic Action Front (IAF), a party dominated by Brotherhood members, were holding press conferences with leftist leaders to protest changes to the election law. When a new law led to losses for both Islamist and leftist parties in the 1993 elections, they began holding irregular meetings as an informal opposition bloc.
Following the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty, Jordan experienced a sharp decline in political freedoms as the regime sought to suppress widespread opposition to the treaty. Ironically, the closing of political space drove diverse political actors to cooperate more frequently on a wider range of issues. These interactions remained mostly tactical, focused on general opposition to U.S. intervention in the region.
A more sustained form of cooperation emerged in 1994 with the formation of the Higher Coordination Committee of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP), led by the IAF and including 13 parties. Over its twelve-year history, the group’s agenda expanded beyond foreign policy to include criticism of authoritarian regime practices. Former IAF leader Abdul Latif Arabiyat described the committee as a democratic model for the Arab world.
Like Egypt, Jordan also saw the formation of new political groups through novel alliances. The 2003 elections featured candidates from the Jordanian Centrist Party, a small but officially licensed group uniting moderate Islamists and leftists around a pluralist reform agenda. Despite its small size, it held two parliamentary seats.
The Brotherhood and the IAF have led cooperative efforts in Jordan. In addition to parliamentary blocs and anti-normalization committees, Islamists have participated in quieter forms of grassroots collaboration. The general trend has moved from purely tactical to normalized strategic cooperation. Still, Islamists maintain red lines on issues such as gender and the implementation of Islamic law. Tensions between the IAF and other opposition groups remain, especially as the IAF seeks to preserve its previously privileged relationship with the regime.
Yemen
Yemen’s main Islamic political party, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah), is a coalition of moderate and radical Islamists, conservative tribal leaders, and businessmen. Due to its internal divisions—e.g., the party formally embraces democracy, while one of its prominent leaders, the hardliner Abdel Majid al-Zindani, openly rejects it—cooperative efforts have varied in sustainability. Its factions share only a vision of conservative Islam as a central pillar of life, with substantial disagreements over how to realize that vision. Yemen illustrates how individual personalities can play critical roles in forging cross-ideological cooperation and the challenges of uniting parties with divergent ideologies, strategies, and relationships with the regime.
After Yemen’s unification in 1990, al-Islah allied closely with the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), largely due to long-standing ties between the regime and various factions within al-Islah. The alliance helped counterbalance the Yemeni Socialist Party’s (YSP) potential gains in the 1993 elections. However, between unification and the elections, nearly 200 YSP members were assassinated, many by Islamists linked to radical factions within al-Islah.
Yet, a decade later, a senior YSP leader was invited as a guest of honor to address al-Islah’s biannual conference—a dramatic shift that reflected less a change in al-Islah’s ideology than the deterioration of its alliance with the GPC. Following the YSP’s defeat in the 1994 civil war, the GPC no longer needed al-Islah’s help to counterbalance the YSP. Within three years, al-Islah’s ministerial positions dropped from nine to zero.
In this context of GPC dominance, the logic of sustained strategic cooperation between al-Islah and other opposition parties became harder to ignore. In 2002, moderate Brotherhood-aligned leaders in al-Islah sought an alliance with the YSP, partly for electoral purposes but with clear intentions of ongoing collaboration. In December 2002, YSP Deputy Secretary General Jarallah Omar addressed al-Islah’s general conference but was assassinated immediately after by a Salafi extremist. Al-Islah condemned the murder, though it remains unclear whether the killer was affiliated with the party.
Nonetheless, al-Islah, the YSP, and four smaller parties formed the “Joint Meeting Parties” coalition in advance of the 2003 elections. Al-Islah agreed not to run candidates in 30 districts where the YSP had better chances, and vice versa in 130 districts favorable to al-Islah.
Yemen shows that even when strategic cooperation makes sense, ideological divisions can undermine credibility. Al-Islah moved from strategic cooperation with the ruling party to tactical and strategic cooperation with the leftist YSP and others. Not all of its members welcomed this shift, highlighting how individual leaders play a pivotal role in building—and legitimizing—cross-ideological cooperation.
A Practical Exercise in Democracy?
Do these new cross-ideological practices hurt or help long-term democratic prospects in the region? Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen show that Islamic–leftist cooperation is expanding even as opportunities for democracy shrink. While most cooperation remains short-term and tactical, instances of sustained, strategic cooperation are increasing. Such cooperation tends to arise when political openings offer an advantage—especially when opposition parties develop a sense of shared purpose in confronting authoritarianism. Yet, even sustained cooperation does not rule out the possibility of individual parties aligning with the regime to pursue their own agendas. Medium-level cooperation does not necessarily signal deeper democratic commitment, but the ease with which many Islamists collaborate with leftists suggests the potential for high-level cooperation in the near future. For now, the few existing cases of high-level intellectual cooperation appear to emerge mainly from the formation of new groups following party splits, rather than broader evolution within established parties.
Sources:
European University Institute & Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Mediterranean Programme, Florence, March 2004; Rockefeller Foundation Conference Center, Bellagio, August 2005.
Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 373–395.
Samer Shehata, “Opposition Politics in Egypt: A Lost Opportunity?” Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 9 (October 2004).
Janine A. Clark, “Conditions of Islamic Moderation: Islamic Alliances in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies (November 2006).
Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamic Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge, 2006).
Sheila Carapico et al., “The Death and Life of Jarallah Omar,” Middle East Report Online, December 31, 2002.
Sheila Carapico, “How Yemen’s Ruling Party Won by a Landslide,” Middle East Report Online, May 16, 2003.