Turkey as a Center for Hamas Activity

Overview^[1]

• Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is one of Hamas’ most important strategic allies, especially since the violent events of the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010. Turkey hosts senior Hamas figures, some of whom have received Turkish citizenship, and provides political, diplomatic and propaganda support, as well as economic and humanitarian assistance.
• Hamas has established one of its most important overseas centers in Turkey, primarily operated by prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal of 2011. It uses Turkey to plan terrorist attacks and transfer funds to finance terrorist activities inside Israel, in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and to raise and launder money in support of its terrorist operations, including the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre.
• The close relationship between Turkey and Hamas was manifested during the Gaza Strip War, when Turkey did not condemn Hamas but sharply criticized Israel, often using antisemitic themes. Throughout the fighting, political coordination continued between Erdoğan, senior Turkish officials and the Hamas leadership, including regarding negotiations with Israel and humanitarian assistance. Turkey also received Palestinian prisoners who were released from Israeli prisons and deported.
• Hamas documents seized by IDF forces in the Gaza Strip during the Gaza Strip War showed the relationship between Hamas and Turkey, including how Hamas used Turkey for terrorist activities against Israel. One document provided the Hamas plan to establish a branch in Turkey to coordinate operations against Israel abroad, including the assassination of military personnel and attacks on Israeli vessels.
• In ITIC assessment, given the Hamas operational infrastructure in Turkey, its deep involvement in terrorism and Turkey’s hostility toward Israel, Hamas will seek to strengthen and expand its ties with Turkey. The deportation of terrorists, particularly senior terrorists from Israel, to Turkey in particular, is likely to reinforce the Hamas operational base in Turkey and facilitate the rebuilding of its military wing and the return of released prisoners to terrorist activities. A Turkish aegis would strengthen the “external” Hamas leadership and increase Hamas terrorist activity outside Israel. Given Turkey’s location and its strained relations with Israel, Israeli security forces would face significant challenges in effectively countering Hamas infrastructure and activities in Turkey.

Developments in Turkey-Hamas Relations

• The relationship between Hamas and Turkey has long been a problematic issue in Turkey-Israel relations, causing tension over time between the two countries. Turkey has never designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and the Turkish government consistently denies any involvement in Hamas terrorist activities, claiming it distinguishes between the Hamas military and political wings, regarding the latter as “legitimate.” In practice, Turkey actively facilitates Hamas terrorist operations in economic, military, political, ideological and propaganda areas.
  • Relations began to strengthen in 2006 after Hamas won the majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections (44%), securing 74 of its 132 seats, forming and heading a unity government. In 2007, following the brutal Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, Turkey increased its ties with Hamas and began direct negotiations with its representatives. Hamas was represented in these talks by Khaled Mashal, then head of the political bureau, and Isma’il Haniyeh, who led the Hamas administration in Gaza. Senior Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, at the time the prime minister, and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, participated in some of the meetings. One of the key topics discussed was Turkey’s assistance in efforts to remove Hamas from the American and European lists of designated terrorist organizations.^[2] Following the meetings, Turkey also began assisting the Gaza Strip, including constructing a hospital and sending water purification equipment.
  • After Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 January 2009), Turkey’s criticism of Israel became particularly harsh, focusing primarily on the bad situation in Gaza. Since then, Erdoğan has repeatedly demanded Israel lift the “blockade” of the Gaza Strip.^[3]
  • Turkey’s support for Hamas and Gaza became more overt following the Mavi Marmara flotilla in May 2010 and the subsequent crisis in Turkey-Israel relations.^[4]
  • When the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, Hamas found itself in need of a different location for its headquarters, after leaving Damascus in support of the uprising against the Assad regime. Turkey’s sympathy for Hamas and the convenient channels of communication between Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Turkey made Turkey an attractive alternative to Damascus.^[5] Consequently, Hamas established a headquarters in Turkey, using it for recruiting operatives, as a communication hub with members (mainly from Judea, Samaria and Israel) and for planning, directing and financing terrorist activity. The importance of the headquarters increased over the years as Hamas promoted an increase in terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. Hamas also established financial institutions, currency exchange offices and businesses in Turkey managed by senior figures to assist financing its operations. In October 2011, senior Hamas terrorist operatives deported as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal settled in Turkey, further expanding Hamas operations.^[6]
  • In 2016, Israel and Turkey reconciled. The agreement included a Turkish commitment not to allow its territory to be used for military operations against Israel and to halt the collection of funds in Turkey for terrorist purposes. Turkey also assured Israel that although Hamas offices in Turkey would remain open, they would be limited to political activities, an empty promise which was never kept.^[7]
• Hamas leaders and Turkish officials and diplomats frequently meet. On November 9, 2019 a Hamas delegation led by Khaled Mashal and Saleh al-‘Arouri met with President Erdoğan and his senior aides, including intelligence chief Hakan Fidan (currently foreign minister).^[8] Among the Hamas documents seized during the war were the minutes of meetings which revealed discussions on the Trump administration’s efforts to advance the document “Deal of the Century,” Turkey’s military operations against the Kurds in northern Syria and criticism of Arab states for failing to stand by Hamas and Turkey. Mashal requested Turkish assistance in securing the release of four Hamas operatives arrested in Libya in 2016 on charges of smuggling weapons to Gaza.^[9] He also complained that Hamas was in financial distress because Iran found it difficult to transfer funds and Saudi Arabia had reduced its support, and had arrested of dozens of Hamas operatives. He praised Turkish support but urged Erdoğan to provide Hamas with a monthly budget and to establish permanent Turkish representation in Gaza, similar to the role played by Mohammed al-Emadi, chairman of Qatar’s National Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza.

• His excellency the president knows the burdens of Hamas, which supports the resistance and stands against the siege on Gaza and Jerusalem.
• On behalf of my brothers, I hope you will decide to allocate an urgent sum of money to support your brothers in Palestine, as a blessing of this meeting, and that you will consider with your brothers the allocation of a monthly sum.
• I know the burdens upon you are great, but any amount you pay will not kill Turkey, while it will sustain Hamas.
• Another matter. You mentioned your role in Gaza, which is positive, but we want the Turkish representation in Gaza and Jerusalem to be more firmly established.
• The aid you send is good, but what is required is a direct Turkish presence in Gaza, which will serve your brothers in Palestine and strengthen Turkey’s role.

• Another Hamas document found by the IDF in Gaza contained the minutes of a meeting held by Mahmoud al-Zahar, a member to the Hamas political bureau, and the deputy Turkish ambassador [in an unnamed country] on October 24, 2017. The deputy ambassador assured al-Zahar that the Hamas leadership could contact the embassy directly, as Erdoğan prioritized the Palestinian issue. He also claimed that “the Jews are playing a dirty game with the Palestinians” and accused them of trying to create division within Turkey because it supported the Palestinians.

The deputy ambassador:

• Thank you to Dr. Abu Khaled for the opportunity to meet with him.
• Turkey holds the same idea and goal as yours and adopts them.
• The Turkish embassy leadership is prepared to receive any request from you directly, regardless of the administrative protocol of official correspondence.
• Whenever President Erdoğan hears or is presented with an issue related to Palestine, he sets everything else aside and gives it priority.

• Operatives from the Hamas military wing also went for academic studies in Turkey, as revealed by another document found by the IDF in Gaza. In a memorandum dated September 8, 2019, Abu Ibrahim from the military wing HR department informed battalion commanders that scholarships were available in Turkey for undergraduate, master’s and doctoral studies, and that each brigade and division should nominate four candidates.

First, we ask Allah to grant you good health and well-being, to assist you and guide you along the path of truth. Regarding the matter mentioned above, we inform you that there are scholarships available in Turkey at three levels (bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate) according to the specializations you specified. Therefore, (4) names should be provided from each battalion, as well as (the name, specialization and level of study) within 72 hours.

Relations between Turkey and Hamas during the Gaza Strip War

• Turkish government officials did not immediately issue a public response to the Hamas attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, did not condemn it or express condolences to Israel. On the morning of October 7, 2023, a delegation of senior Hamas figures met with members of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). When reports of the attack in Israel’s south arrived, Hamas operatives expressed great joy. According to a report, which included a transcript of the conversation, one of the Turkish intelligence officers acknowledged that Hamas had carried out “a very large and unexpected operation,” but when he inquired about the next stage, he was met with silence and warned that Israel’s response would be very strong. The report also hinted that the Hamas political bureau might not have known the military wing was planning an attack (HABER10, January 21, 2025).
• On October 17, 2023, Turkey began to issue harsh condemnations of Israel, particularly after the explosion at al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza on October 17, 2023.^[13] On October 28, 2023, a large pro-Hamas rally was held in Turkey, led by President Erdoğan. He gradually escalated his anti-Israeli rhetoric, at every opportunity accusing Israel of committing “genocide.” He frequently made antisemitic remarks and compared Israel to the Nazi regime. Turkey also participated in the anti-Israeli lawfare by joining South Africa’s lawsuit at the International Court of Justice, alleging that Israel had violated the Genocide Convention during the war in Gaza.
• In contrast to his harsh criticism of Israel, Erdoğan referred to Hamas as a “resistance group fighting to defend its land.” He claimed Hamas represented the essence of the Palestinian “liberation movement” and refused to condemn it. As he did after the Mavi Marmara flotilla, he threatened Israel, stating that Turkey could “strike unexpectedly at any time.” Turkey also warned Israel against “illegal actions” targeting Hamas leaders residing in Turkey, claiming that “there would be severe consequences” (Reuters, December 4, 2023).
• At the same time, Turkey sent large quantities of humanitarian aid to Gaza and allowed preparations to be made on Turkish soil for a flotilla to sail to Gaza’s shores. The flotilla was scheduled to set sail in April 2024 but its departure was apparently prevented by diplomacy.^[14] In January 2024, Turkey announced it had removed Israel from its list of export destinations. Turkey also admitted wounded Gazans into its territory (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, February 15, 2024). In May 2024, Erdoğan announced that more than a thousand Hamas operatives had arrived in Turkey for medical treatment. Later, his aides claimed that he was referring to Palestinians in general and not specifically to Hamas operatives (Reuters, May 13, 2024).

• On April 30, 2024, in Jerusalem’s Old City, a Turkish tourist stabbed an Israeli Border Police fighter. The terrorist, 34-year-old Hasan Saklanan, had entered Israel the previous day from Jordan via the Allenby Bridge (Israeli media, April 30, 2024). It was the first attack carried out inside Israeli territory by a Turkish citizen. According to assessments he acted alone, but there was suspicion that he had been influenced by the anti-Israel incitement and propaganda prevalent in Turkey at the time.
• Since the start of the war Turkey allowed Hamas operatives to operate freely on its soil and permitted senior Hamas officials previously expelled to return. The Turkish foreign minister, acting under Erdoğan’s directives, took action to whitewash Hamas’ image around the globe, while Turkish media actively promoted messages originating from Gaza.
• Meanwhile, Turkey sought to play politics by trying to use the situation to gain a greater regional foothold and have more influence on the Palestinian arena. During the first two months of the war, Turkey called for a “security arrangement” in which Turkish forces would be stationed in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, a proposal blocked by the United States and Israel. Turkey also offered to act as a “mediator” and sought to shape the “day after” in Gaza (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, April 24, 2024). To exert influence, throughout the war Turkey hosted meetings of senior Hamas figures with Erdoğan and high-ranking Turkish officials. Isma’il Haniyeh, the late head of the Hamas political bureau, visited Turkey twice during the war, the last time in April 2024 for two weeks [before he was killed in an Israeli strike on Tehran on July 31, 2024] (al-Aqsa Telegram channel, April 20, 2024).

• Turkey also sought to be involved in the ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations, and senior Hamas figures regularly updated Turkish officials on developments. For example, speaking with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on July 16, 2024, Isma’il Haniyeh reported Hamas had responded positively to the proposals of the mediators and accused Israel of not wanting to end the war. Fidan praised Hamas’ stance in the negotiations (Hamas Telegram channel, July 16, 2024). According to reports Israel told Turkey it was willing to include it in mediation efforts to reach a hostage release deal. In response Erdoğan claimed Turkey was prepared to provide any assistance necessary to facilitate the agreement (YNET, November 27, 2024).
• On January 29, 2025, Erdoğan met in Ankara with a Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish, head of the Shura Council, and including Khaled Mashal, Hamas “external” leader (Hamas Telegram channel, January 29, 2025). A day later, “sources” reported Erdoğan had directed Turkish intelligence to use its ties with Hamas to secure the release of five Thai hostages held by the Hamas military wing as part of the ceasefire and hostage-release deal (Hürriyet, January 30, 2025). Turkey then accepted 15 Palestinian prisoners released by Israel as part of the deal and deported abroad (Telegram channel of journalist Yassin Qadi, February 4, 2025; Anadolu Agency, February 4, 2025).
• Turkey’s attitude toward Hamas was also indicated by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who told al-Jazeera that Hamas was “a legitimate political party.” He added that Hamas was a “resistance movement” and not merely an organization composed of individuals, but rather an “idea and ideology” born from the “Israeli occupation.” Fidan further claimed that even if Hamas were to step aside, another entity would appear which would display “even greater resistance^[15] [sic]” than Hamas and fight Israel even more fiercely (al-Jazeera, February 26, 2025).

Hamas Activity in Turkey

• Given Turkey’s blatantly sympathetic position, senior Hamas figures have taken advantage of Turkish hospitality to establish a terrorist hub which actively recruits operatives, orchestrates attacks and raises funds. Israeli security forces’ revelations and counterterrorism operations over the years have exposed Hamas’ extensive military and financial activity which takes place in Turkey. Hamas operates without interference and is aided by Turkish citizens, some of whom have government connections. The Hamas office in Turkey has also laundered money through dedicated financial institutions it established. It is not unthinkable to assume that Hamas operations in Turkey contributed to the acquisition of capabilities which were ultimately used in carrying out the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre.
• Further proof of the close relationship between Hamas and Turkey is that Turkey is one of the few countries where Hamas has official representation. According to a summary document of a Hamas leadership meeting (in Gaza and “external”) from February 2023, found by the IDF in Gaza, Musa Akari was appointed as Hamas representative in Turkey, replacing Jihad Yaghmour, with a note indicating the need to update the Turkish leadership about the appointment.

First: Representation of the movement in Turkey

1. Appointment of Brother Musa Akari as the movement’s representative in Turkey.

2. Brother Jihad Yaghmour will continue his work alongside Brother Musa Akari for a period to be determined by our brothers in the Office for Arab and Islamic Relations, but no less than three months.

3. Inform our Turkish brothers that Brother Jihad is currently continuing his work and that there is an ongoing process to appoint a new representative for the movement. The head of the Office for Arab and Islamic Relations will determine the most suitable wording to update the Turks regarding the timing, given their engagement with the earthquake disaster.

Turkey as a center for planning, funding and directing terrorist attacks

• The Hamas headquarters in Turkey plays a central role in directing terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria, at times possibly without the knowledge of Hamas operatives in Gaza. In recent years, including during the Gaza Strip War, Israeli security forces exposed terrorist facilities and squads in Judea and Samaria which were planning attacks on Israeli targets, including large-scale attacks. Many of the terrorists, most of them Palestinians from Judea and Samaria who had studied abroad, were recruited, directed and funded by Hamas operatives in Turkey, and some even underwent training in Turkey:^[17]
  • On March 6, 2023, a Palestinian from Judea and Samaria returning from academic studies in Turkey was detained. During interrogation he revealed that while in Turkey he was recruited by Hamas and underwent military training in Turkey and Syria. Before returning home, he met in Turkey with senior Hamas operative Azzam Aqra, who told him to receive weapons and funds, recruit additional terrorists, train them and establish terrorist squads for carrying out attacks (Israel Security Agency, March 6, 2023).
  • On June 3, 2024, Israeli security forces prevented a bombing attack in central Israel which had been directed by Hamas headquarters in Turkey. A Palestinian living in Jordan was detained in Nablus. During interrogation, he revealed he had been recruited in Turkey in December 2023 by Hamas operative Imad Obeid to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Israel for Hamas. He received funds and instructions to carry out the attack and collect an explosive device hidden in Judea and Samaria. Other Hamas operatives were detained and interrogation revealed that the bomb had been prepared and concealed according to the directives of Hudayfa Salima, a Hamas commander in Turkey (Israel Security Agency website, June 4, 2024).
  • In July and August 2024, Israeli security forces exposed several students affiliated with the Hamas cell in the Birzeit University student association who were planning an attack. During interrogation they said they were operating on behalf of Hamas headquarters in Turkey, which provided operational facilities and transferred funds to field operatives. Weapons and large sums of money sent from Hamas headquarters were found in their possession (Israel Security Agency spokesperson and Israeli media, July 21, 2024).

Turkey as a center for covert Hamas activity

• An undated, unsigned document found by the IDF in Gaza was headed “Establishing a branch in Turkey.” According to the document, after Israel had dealt “painful blows” to Palestinian “resistance” operations abroad, it had become necessary to establish a new security branch abroad for conducting “intelligence and military [sic] operations.” Turkey was identified as the preferred location. The document gave a timeline and stated the branch would be fully operational within three years, following the establishment of military cells, the creation of secure safe houses and the training of operatives. The two operatives assigned to establish the branch were to receive a salary of $1,500 each to cover “tuition fees, rent and initial operational equipment.”

Two: Objectives of the operation

1. To carry out targeted attacks (eliminating Mossad officers and commanders around the globe and eliminating influential Israeli targets).

2. To carry out specific military operations (attacking naval units, targeting Israeli ships, conducting kidnappings).

3. To gather intelligence indicating the intelligence efforts within the Gaza Strip.

• In October 2020, it was revealed that Hamas had secretly established a cyber and intelligence unit in Istanbul about two years earlier. The unit operated separately from the Hamas offices which dealt with coordination and funding. The unit was managed by the Hamas military wing and was established without the knowledge of the Turkish government. It was headed by Samah Sarraj, who was subordinate to Yahya al-Sinwar, then the head of the Hamas political bureau in Gaza. The objective of the unit was to procure dual-use materials which Israel had banned from entering Gaza out of concerns they could be used by Hamas to manufacture weapons (The Times, October 22, 2020). Following the revelations, Turkish authorities reportedly began imposing restrictions on Hamas operatives and stopped granting citizenship and residency permits to Hamas members (Watan 24 al-Akhbariya, October 29, 2020).
• Turkey also served as a way station for Hamas operatives en route to training in Iran. According to a Hamas document discovered in Gaza, fighters from the so-called Shadow Unit, a secret Hamas unit operating under the direct supervision of al-Sinwar, left Gaza in late 2019 for Iran via Turkey to receive UAV training.

We received information from our secret sources regarding four individuals belonging to the Shadow Unit of the al-Qassam Brigades, who were smuggled out of the Gaza Strip to Turkey. According to verified information, these individuals are being smuggled to Iran to undergo high-level specialized training in piloting military UAVs. It has been confirmed that they left the Gaza Strip on November 18, 2019.

Turkey as a center for Hamas financial investments

• Turkey has also become a financial center for Hamas affairs, including funding its military buildup and terrorist activities. The financial network is managed by Zaher Jabarin, head of the Hamas finance department and the current leader of Hamas operations in Judea and Samaria following the killing of Saleh al-‘Arouri in January 2024. Hamas has established real estate companies, investment funds, currency exchange offices, businesses, charities and nonprofit organizations in Turkey, all managed by senior Hamas officials. The scale of this financial activity has turned Turkey into a major financial hub, overseeing assets worth more than half a billion dollars.^[20]
• Turkish citizens, including those government connections, are also involved in Hamas’ financial operations. That is possible because unlike many other banking systems worldwide, Turkey does not impose any restrictions on Hamas’ financial activities, and the Turkish authorities turn a blind eye to the origins of the funds. The extent of Hamas’ financial involvement in Turkey was exposed during the Gaza Strip War when the United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on people involved in funding Hamas.
• In February 2018 Israeli security forces detained two suspects who had been operating under Hamas direction from Turkey. The interrogation of one suspect, a Turkish law professor named Kamil Tekeli, revealed that Turkey was assisting the Hamas military buildup, including through SADAT, a company established by Adnan Basha, a close associate of the Turkish government. SADAT was created to provide funds and weapons for the establishment of a “Palestinian army” to fight Israel. One company employee helped Hamas terrorist operatives attend a weapons exhibition in Turkey in 2015, where they expressed interest in UAV technology (Israel Security Agency, February 12, 2018).
• The other suspect was Dirgham Jabarin, who was recruited to Hamas by Zaher Jabarin during visits to Turkey under the guise of business activities at IMES, a Turkish company. For a year and a half Dirgham Jabarin made frequent visits to Turkey, during which his mission was to transfer funds from Turkey to Hamas in Judea and Samaria. He received hundreds of thousands of euros from Hamas operatives in Turkey, which he hid in prearranged locations in Judea and Samaria. Investigation revealed that the operation was directed by Zaher Jabarin and Salameh Mar’i,^[21] with assistance from Tekeli (Israel Security Agency, February 14, 2018). ^[22]
• On September 10, 2019, the United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 15 Hamas operatives and financial assistants, including currency exchange offices and money transfer companies which support terrorist organizations. The investigation exposed extensive Hamas money-laundering operations in Turkey through multiple companies owned by Hamas operatives. They were used to camouflage the transfer of millions of dollars to the Hamas military wing in Gaza and to fund terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. The investigation also revealed that the primary source of Hamas funding through Turkey (and sometimes Lebanon) was Iran, with funds transferred via the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (United States Treasury Department website, September 10, 2019).^[23]
• Entities involved in Hamas’ financial operations in Turkey include:
  • The Kuwait-Turk Bank, which enables Hamas operatives to make unrestricted financial transfers. According to The Wall Street Journal, that led American officials to meet with senior members of the Turkish banking sector and demand they halt Hamas financing and money laundering or risk losing access to America’s financial markets (Globes, December 21, 2023).
  • Redin Exchange is a sanctioned company which acts as a financial conduit for Hamas. Isma’il Tash, the company’s deputy director, maintained regular contact with Hamas facilitators to transfer funds from Iran to Hamas. An employee named Mohammed Sarur was involved in a $10 million transfer to the Hamas military wing in March 2019 (United States Treasury Department website, September 10, 2019).
  • Smart (Smart Trading Company) is a Turkish import-export company owned by Isma’il Tash, suspected of being a front company linked to Redin Exchange. Both companies share the same address in Istanbul (United States Treasury Department website, September 10, 2019).

      
Right: Redin Exchange offices in Istanbul. Left: Smart Trading Company business card (khalas-Hamas Facebook page, September 12, 2019)

• • The IMES Company was noticed in February 2018 following the detentions of Kamil Tekeli and Dirgham Jabarin in Israel. Investigation revealed that Hamas operatives owned IMES, which was used to camouflage money-laundering operations worth millions of dollars (Israel Security Agency website, February 14, 2018).
  • Trend GYO is a real estate investment fund based in Turkey and controlled by Hamas. According to the United States State and Treasury Departments, as of 2018 Hamas controlled about 75% of Trend GYO’s capital. Hamas also planned to privately issue more than $15 million in its shares to important members of its investment portfolio (United States Treasury Department website, May 24, 2022).

Turkish Support for Hamas

• The Gaza Strip War further exposed the depth of Hamas operations in Turkey and the extent of Turkish support for the organization. While Erdoğan represents his backing for Hamas as purely political, Hamas activities on Turkish soil extend far beyond politics. For years, Turkey has allowed Hamas to recruit operatives, orchestrate attacks and fund terrorism from its headquarters in Turkey, as Turkish authorities turn a blind eye and permit Hamas to operate freely within the country.
• Politically, for years Turkey has provided a safe haven for Hamas leaders, hosting the senior Hamas roster and granting them Turkish citizenship. Erdoğan himself has held public meetings with the Hamas leadership as part of his political support.
• For years Turkey has consistently denied that it allows Hamas to operate against Israel from its territory. In December 2019, an investigative report revealed Hamas terrorist activities in Turkey, including plots to assassinate Israeli figures. Among the targets were Nir Barkat (then Jerusalem mayor), Yehuda Glick (former Knesset member) and former police chief Roni Alsheikh (The Telegraph, December 18, 2019). Following the publication of the report, Turkey’s foreign ministry issued a denial, claiming Hamas was a legitimate organization which won the 2006 elections in Gaza and was recognized not only by Turkey. Turkey rejected allegations that its territory was being used for operations against Israel or any other country.

• In the past, there was internal Turkish criticism of Hamas’ presence. In 2010, Turkish researcher Soner Çağaptay, who lives in the United States, criticized Erdoğan’s ruling AKP party for allowing Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood to operate politically and issue propaganda from Turkey (Hürriyet, 2010).^[24] However, as the control of Erdoğan and the ruling party over the media strengthened, including Hürriyet, such criticism dwindled to a minimum.

Refuge and logistical support for Hamas terrorist operatives

• For years, Turkey has served as a refuge for Hamas operatives expelled from Israel, where they established one of the largest Hamas branches outside Gaza and Judea and Samaria. The economic infrastructure in Turkey also provided funding for Hamas operations. One of the key figures in building it was Saleh al-‘Arouri, who served as deputy head of the Hamas foreign bureau and later deputy head of the Hamas political bureau before being killed in Beirut on January 2, 2024.
• The Hamas presence in Turkey grew significantly in October 2011, when ten Hamas operatives released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal were deported to Turkey. Turkey promised to monitor them, but in reality they operated freely, continuing to construct a Hamas terrorist infrastructure, including recruitment, fundraising and attack planning. For example, Mahmoud Toameh, originally from Tulkarm and living in Saudi Arabia, was detained by Israeli security forces and revealed details of Hamas headquarters in Turkey. His statements confirmed that Turkey provided financial support for the Hamas deportees (Israel Security Agency, May 28, 2014).
• Despite official denials, Turkey apparently both encouraged Hamas’ presence and ignored their military activities. In 2020, Turkey granted citizenship to 12 Hamas operatives, some with fake Turkish names, and their families also received citizenship. Some of the operatives were involved in recruiting members and planning attacks. Among them was Zakariya Najib, a Hamas operative previously involved in assassination plots targeting the mayor of Jerusalem and other Israeli officials, as well as Jihad Yaghmour (former Hamas representative in Turkey) and Hisham Hijaz (The Telegraph, August 13, 2020). Granting them Turkish citizenship complicates Israeli efforts to target them.
• Israeli security forces exposed multiple instances in which Hamas operated in Turkey without interference, often with Turkish citizens and officials aiding them. For example, during interrogation Kamil Tekeli said that since 2012 he had been asked to help Hamas operatives settle in Turkey. Many of them had been released and deported in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal, and he helped them obtain residency permits, rent and purchase apartments and businesses, acquire vehicles and establish financial footholds by registering companies in their names (Israel Security Agency, February 14, 2018).
• Even during the Gaza Strip War, Hamas operations in Turkey continued. In November 2024, “Israeli sources” confirmed that Hamas leaders were living in Turkey, despite official Turkish denials (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, November 18, 2024).
• At least three senior Hamas operatives who had previously left Turkey at the government’s request returned during the war. Several Hamas offices that had been closed before the war (as part of Turkey’s diplomatic outreach to the West and Israel) were reopened, and the Hamas military wing resumed operations. Zaher Jabarin, Hamas chief financier and successor to Saleh al-‘Arouri in charge of Judea and Samaria operations, lives in Turkey. Jabarin also coordinated Isma’il Haniyeh’s April 2024 visit to Turkey, where he met with Erdoğan. “Security sources” reported discussions regarding the possibility of relocating the Hamas leadership to Turkey if Qatar succumbed to American pressure and expelled Hamas figures from its territory (Israel Hayom, June 26, 2024).
• On November 19, 2024, the United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions and froze assets of six senior Hamas figures, three of whom live in Turkey (United States Treasury Department website, November 19, 2024).^[25]

Economic Assistance

• Turkey is one of Gaza’s major donors, providing extensive economic assistance to Hamas and Palestinians in general. Turkey views financial support as a means of increasing its influence among the Palestinians. The funds transferred by Turkish aid organizations to Gaza have been used for civilian projects, such as constructing hospitals, renovating buildings and public institutions, infrastructure projects and humanitarian aid for the civilian population. Two prominent organizations have maintained a permanent presence in Gaza:
  • The IHH: A radical Islamist, anti-Israel and anti-Western NGO, which has been outlawed in Israel. It maintains close ties with the Turkish government and plays an active role in the international campaign to delegitimize Israel. It led the attempts to send flotillas to Gaza in an effort to “break the blockade” and purchased the ships that took part in the Mavi Marmara flotilla, which ended in a violent confrontation with Israeli naval forces on May 31, 2010.^[26] Investigation revealed that the IHH served as a direct financial conduit for the Hamas military wing, funding the establishment of a naval force training facility and the purchase of weapons and other military equipment (Shin Bet, March 21, 2017)
  • TIKA: A Turkish government aid agency subordinate to the prime minister’s office, it has operated in Ramallah since 2006 and opened an office in Gaza in 2012. In February 2017, the Shin Bet detained Muhammad Farouq Shaaban Murtaja, a Gazan who managed TIKA’s office in the Strip, on suspicion of working for the Hamas military wing.^[27]
• As part of measures to build trust in preparation for the Israel-Turkey normalization agreement in 2016, Israel lifted some restrictions on the transfer of construction materials so the Turks could construct a hospital in Gaza. During the Gaza Strip War IDF forces exposed a tunnel system linking the Turkish hospital to the al-Israa University building in southern Gaza City and extending to the al-Zeitoun neighborhood. Hamas military wing operatives used the tunnels to move between different brigades in Gaza (IDF Spokesperson, February 26, 2024)
• Since the beginning of the Gaza Strip War and Turkey’s alignment with Hamas, Turkey has sent thousands of tons of aid to Gaza and requested to join the countries air-lifting humanitarian aid, but its request was denied by Israel. (Israeli media, April 8, 2024). On one occasion, President Erdoğan boasted that over 1,000 Hamas operatives were receiving medical treatment in hospitals across Turkey (Israeli TV Channel 7, May 13, 2024). After the ceasefire, the IHH established six “tent cities” in the Gaza Strip (IHH website, February 17, 2025)

Ideological and propaganda support

• Hamas and Erdoğan’s AKP party are ideologically affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2002 Turkey has maintained a strong ideological alliance with Hamas. In 2017, Erdoğan referenced the antisemitic “Trees and Stones” hadith, which calls for the killing of Jews, a passage included in Article 7 of the Hamas charter. At the 2017 the Pioneers of Jerusalem conference in Istanbul, Maher Salah, at the time a Hamas leader, threatened Israel, claiming it “won’t last 100 years.” Neither Erdoğan nor Turkish officials condemned these statements. (INSS Strategic Update, July 2014).

Appendix 1: Hamas Operatives in Turkey

Saleh al-‘Arouri

• Saleh al-‘Arouri served as deputy head of the Hamas “external headquarters” and later as deputy head of the Hamas political bureau. He was one of the key figures in establishing Hamas in Turkey.^[28] He first came into public attention in July 2014, when at the Fourth Conference of the International Union of Muslim Scholars in Turkey he said the Hamas military wing was behind the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in Gush Etzion on June 12, 2014. The attack triggered Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza. In 2017, he was forced to leave Turkey following American-Israeli pressure and relocated to Qatar, then later to the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut, from where he continued to direct the Hamas office in Turkey. On January 2, 2024, he was killed in Beirut in a targeted IDF attack.^[29]

Jihad Yaghmour

• Israeli security investigations into terrorist detainees revealed that Jihad Yaghmour was an important liaison between Hamas and Turkey.^[30] While Saleh al-‘Arouri played a leading role in managing Hamas operations in Turkey, Yaghmour was publicly presented as the official Hamas representative in Turkey until 2023. His official role was first publicly revealed on December 14, 2019, during a visit by Isma’il Haniyeh, at the time head of Hamas’ political bureau. Yaghmour, originally from Beit Hanina (north of Jerusalem), was involved in the 1994 kidnapping of Israeli soldier Nachshon Wachsman. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and later deported to Turkey in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal. He was officially the president of the Jerusalem and Our History Association, which was most probably a cover for his real role as Hamas liaison with the Turkish government and Turkish intelligence (MIT). He wassuspected of coordinating terrorist cells in Judea and Samaria under al-‘Arouri’s direction.

     
Right: Jihad Yaghmour in his office at the Jerusalem and Our History Association, most probably a cover for his secret activities (Association website) Left: Yaghmour accompanying Isma’il Haniyeh during his visit to Turkey (Jerusalem and Our History Association X account, December 13, 2019)

Musa Akari

• A Hamas military operative, Akari was a member of the squad which murdered Israeli police officer Nissim Toledano on December 13, 1992.^[31] He was captured and sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment but was released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal and deported to Turkey. His brother, Ibrahim al-Akari, carried out a stabbing attack in Jerusalem in November 2014. In February 2023, Akari was appointed as Hamas representative in Turkey, replacing Jihad Yaghmour.

Zaher Jabarin

• Zaher Jabarin (Abu Islam) was born in Salfit, near Nablus, in 1968. He was one of the founders of the Hamas military in Judea and Samaria, recruited Yahya Ayyash. “the engineer,” and wrote the first Hamas leaflet in Judea and Samaria In 1993. He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 35 years for involvement in attacks which killed Israeli civilians and security personnel, released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal and deported to Turkey, where he established his operational base. He is currently a member of the Hamas political bureau and head of the Hamas finance department, managing an annual budget of tens of millions of dollars. He developed the extensive Hamas financial network in Turkey, which enabled him to fund, invest and launder money before transferring it to Gaza, Judea and Samaria. After al-‘Arouri was killed in January 2024, Jabarin was appointed head of Hamas operations in Judea and Samaria, and liaised between Hamas and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force. However, in a July 2023 memo, Saeed Izadi, head of the “Palestine branch” of the Qods Force, sent a memo to Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing angry that Jabarin knew secrets because he did not “know how to keep his mouth shut.”^[32]

Right: Zaher Jabarin speaking at a ceremony for Palestinian prisoners deported to Egypt as part of the Gaza ceasefire agreement (al-Aqsa TV, January 30, 2025) Left: Jabarin (far left) alongside Saleh al-‘Arouri in a Hamas leadership meeting in Cairo (Hamas website, February 22, 2018)

Ibrahim al-Madhoun

• Ibrahim al-Madhoun is a Palestinian journalist, political analyst and columnist, originally from Gaza City. He is affiliated with Hamas and a member of its national relations department. Since 2018 he has lived in Turkey, where he manages Association for Palestine Communicators and Media (FIMED), which promotes Palestinian narratives in Turkish society and covers Palestinian, Turkish and Middle Eastern affairs. He was a close associate of Yahya al-Sinwar, the late head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip.^[33]

Right: Ibrahim al-Madhoun’s profile picture with the Palestinian and Turkish flags (al-Madhoun’s X account, March 3, 2024) Left: His X account identifying him as a member of the Hamas international relations department (al-Madhoun’s X account, December 13, 2021)

Abd al-Rahman Ghanimat (Abu Osama)

• Abd al-Rahman Ghanimat (Abu Osama) is from Surif, north of Hebron. He was formerly a Hamas commander in southern Judea and Samaria, the Hebron and Bethlehem area. He headed the Surif terrorist squad, which was responsible for several deadly attacks inside Israeli territory, including the 1997 Café Apropo bombing in Tel Aviv.^[34] He was sentenced to five terms of life imprisonment, released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal and relocated to Turkey. He worked closely with Saleh al-‘Arouri. On November 20, 2024, the United States government imposed sanctions against him.

Haroun Mansour Yaqub Nasser al-Din

• Haroun Mansour Yaqub Nasser al-Din was released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal after serving a life sentence. He bragged that Turkey allowed Hamas former prisoners to leave and enter the country as they pleased.

Amer Kamal Sharif al-Shawa

• Amer Kamal Sharif al-Shawa is a Hamas financier based in Turkey. He is the CEO of Trend GYO, the Hamas real estate investment fund in Turkey. He was on the board of directors of several Hamas-established investment companies. As of 2018, Hamas controlled about 75% of Trend GYO’s issued capital. Hamas also planned to privately issue more than $15 million worth of Trend GYO shares for Hamas executives. On October 18, 2023, the United States Treasury Department designated him as a specially designated global terrorist. In December 2023, the United States State Department offered a $10 million reward for information about him and four other Hamas financial operatives (Rewards for Justice, United States State Department website, December 15, 2023).

Ahmed Saho Jahab

• Ahmed Saho Jahab works in the Turkey-based Hamas investment network. He is the secretary of the Hamas investment portfolio, and coordinates financial operations for various companies owned by Hamas or Hamas operatives. On October 18, 2023, he was designated as a specially designated global terrorist by the United States Treasury Department (United States Treasury Department website, October 18, 2023). The State Department offered a $10 million reward for information about him (Rewards for Justice, United States State Department website, December 15, 2023).

Appendix 2: Orchestrating Terrorist Attacks and Funding Terrorist Activity from Turkey

• Over the years, the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) has exposed numerous Hamas networks operating from Turkey, and successfully prevented terrorist attacks and financial transfers for supporting Hamas’ operations in Judea and Samaria, including during the Gaza Strip War:
  • On August 3, 2017, a route for financial transfers involving couriers was exposed. The route ran between Hamas headquarters in Turkey, Gaza and Hebron. The operation began in early 2016, the brainchild of Muhammad Maher Badr, a senior Hamas terrorist operative in Hebron and a Palestinian Legislative Council member. He recruited a Hamas operative from Hebron who traveled to Turkey as a businessman, accompanied by another resident of Hebron. Their job was to transfer funds from Turkey to Hamas operatives in Hebron, including payments to former Hamas prisoners. In Turkey they had several meetings with Haroun Nasser al-Din, a Gilad Shalit exchange deal deportee from Hebron who provided them with tens of thousands of dollars. The money was laundered by the purchase of goods in Turkey which were then shipped to Hebron via international shipping companies. Once the goods were sold, the profits were transferred to Hamas operatives, minus the couriers’ commission. (Shin Bet website, August 3, 2017)
  • In February 2018, the Israeli security forces detained Kamil Tekeli and Dirgham Jabarin. Investigation revealed that they had been recruited in Turkey by Zaher Jabarin as directed by Saleh al-‘Arouri. One of the detainees revealed that Turkey actively aided the Hamas military buildup, including through a company founded under the guidance of Adnan Pasha, a Turkish government advisor. Hamas engaged in extensive money laundering in Turkey under Jabarin’s supervision, with Turkish authorities turning a blind eye. Hamas operatives owned a company called IMES, which was used to launder millions of dollars for Hamas operations in Gaza and in various countries (Shin Bet website, February 14, 2018)
  • On August 2018, the Israeli security forces exposed a Hamas network operating in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria. It was directed by Hamas headquarters in Turkey and planned to carry out a coup against the Palestinian Authority and take control of Judea and Samaria by undermining security stability and carrying out terrorist attacks in Israel. More than 600,000 NIS (about $150,000) was confiscated. The network was headed by an operative from the Ramallah area recruited by Saleh al-‘Arouri. (Shin Bet website, August 18, 2018)
  • In September 2022, Israeli security forces closed a terrorist finance network operating from the Hamas student cell at Birzeit University. The network transferred funds for financing terrorism from Turkey through Gaza to the Ramallah area. The investigation revealed that the network was in contact with Hamas in Turkey and the Gaza Strip, who gave them their instructions. The funds were transferred via credit card, through couriers who entered Israeli territory as workers. The operatives on the ground withdrew the funds from ATMs in Ramallah, enabling the financing of terrorist activities (Shin Bet website, September 6, 2022)
  • On March 6, 2023, a Palestinian from Judea and Samaria was detained after returning from university studies in Turkey. Investigation revealed that he was recruited by Hamas in Turkey and underwent military training in Turkey and Syria. Before returning home, he met with senior Hamas figure Azzam Aqra, who instructed him to receive weapons and funds, recruit additional operatives and establish terrorist squads in preparation for terrorist attacks (Shin Bet website, March 6, 2023)
  • On June 3, 2024, Israeli security forces in Nablus detained a Palestinian who lived in Jordan. He revealed he had been recruited by Imad Obeid, a Hamas operative in Turkey in December 2023. He agreed to carry out a suicide bombing in Israel for Hamas. He received funds and instructions for the attack. He also had to retrieve an explosive device hidden in Judea and Samaria. During the investigation other Hamas terrorist operatives were detained, who revealed that the explosive device had been planted following orders from Hudayfa Salima, a Hamas commander in Turkey (Shin Bet media report, June 4, 2024)
  • On July 21, 2024, a terrorist attack was prevented. It had been planned by operatives of a five-man terrorist squad of students who belonged to a Hamas cell at Birzeit University. The operation was orchestrated by Hamas headquarters in Turkey. When the terrorists were detained, the Israeli forces found M16 rifles and tens of thousands of dollars sent from Hamas in Turkey (Shin Bet website, July 21, 2024)

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC’s daily updates as well as its other publications
2. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952.
3. Galia Lindenstrauss and Soufiane Kadi-Kouam, “Turkey-Hamas Relations: Between Strategic Considerations and Ideological Affinity,” *Strategic Update*, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2014. (Hebrew)
4. On May 30, 2010, several ships set sail to Israel from various ports in Europe, carrying hundreds of “activists.” Their stated goal was to break the naval blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip and provoke an international media incident. The Mavi Marmara, the ship after which the flotilla was named, set sail from Turkey. As the flotilla approached Israel’s territorial waters the IDF ordered them to halt. After refusing and continuing on their course, Israeli Navy forces began taking control of the vessels to redirect them to the Port of Ashdod. Ten Turkish citizens were killed aboard the Mavi Marmara. The incident continues to cloud Turkey-Israel relations. For further information, see the ITIC June 8, 2010 report, “IHH Preparations for a Violent Confrontation with IDF Soldiers Aboard the Turkish Ship Mavi Marmara.”
5. In 2018, Jihad Yaghmour, Hamas representative in Turkey, claimed that unlike other Muslim leaders and majority-Muslim countries, Erdoğan was genuine in his love for Jerusalem, as evident in Turkey’s extensive investments in associations and its material and moral support for Jerusalem. According to Yaghmour, Erdoğan was the only one who truly cared about al-Aqsa Mosque and the only one who understood what needed to be done.
6. On October 18, 2011, IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, who was abducted by Hamas in June 2006, was returned in exchange for the release of 1,027 security prisoners, including terrorists sentenced to multiple life terms for the murder of Israelis. Forty of the released prisoners were deported abroad, some arriving in Turkey.
7. As a result, Saleh al-‘Arouri, Hamas leader in Judea and Samaria, was forced to leave Turkey in 2016. He moved to Qatar and later relocated to Lebanon.
8. For reasons which are unclear, the Hamas leadership denied the meeting took place. For further information, see the ITIC weekly “Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 6-19, 2019).”
9. On December 2, 2023, Libyan media reported that after Turkey’s intervention, the authorities in Tripoli released the four Hamas operatives, who were flown to Istanbul on a private jet (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, December 2, 2023).
10. For the full document, click Document 1. The translated section is marked in red.
11. For the full document, click Document 2. The translated section is marked in red.
12. For the full document, click Document 3. The translated section is marked in red.
13. On October 17, 2023, an explosion occurred in a parking lot near the al-Ahli Hospital in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City. Hamas accused Israel of attacking the hospital, claiming that several hundred Palestinians, displaced from northern Gaza, were killed in the explosion. However, subsequent investigations by Israeli, Arab and international sources determined that the explosion was caused by a failed Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket launch.
14. For further information, see the April 2024 ITIC report, “Organizing Aid Flotillas to the Gaza Strip and international arenas.”
15. Terrorism and violence.
16. For the full document, click Document 4. The translated section is marked in red.
17. For details on preventing attacks planned by Hamas headquarters in Turkey, see Appendix B.
18. For the full document, click Document 5. The translated section is marked in red.
19. For the full document, click Document 6. The translated section is marked in red.
20. For further information, see the November 2023 ITIC report, “Financing Terrorism: Currency Exchange in the Service of Hamas“
21. Salameh Mar’i is a Palestinian who was released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal and involved in a shooting attack in the Burqin area in March 1993, in which an IDF soldier was murdered.
22. For information regarding money transfers from Turkey to terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria exposed by the Israeli Security Agency, see Appendix B. ↑
23. For further information, see the September 2019 ITIC report, “New designations recently published by the US Department of State and Department of the Treasury reveal Turkey’s central role as a hub from which Hamas handles its financial matters, including funding terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria.”
24. For further information, see the July 2010 ITIC report, “Internal Turkish criticism of the Islamic regime for enabling Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood to conduct political-propaganda activity on Turkish soil and sway public opinion against Israel and the West.” ↑
25. For information about senior Hamas operatives residing in Turkey, see Appendix B.
26. For further information, see the January 2011 ITIC report, “The Turkish IHH, which has a record of supporting terrorist groups, has close relations with Turkey’s AKP government. The Turkish regime gave it governmental support, including logistic and political propaganda assistance for the Mavi Marmara flotilla,” and the August 2014 report, “The IHH, the jihadist Turkish organization that played a major role in the Mavi Marmara flotilla, currently leads an international anti-Israeli coalition that announced its intention to dispatch another flotilla to the Gaza Strip in 2014.”
27. For further information, see the March 2017 ITIC report, “Hamas’s military wing uses foreign aid funds sent to the Gaza Strip: The case of the head of the Gaza Strip office of the Turkish aid organization TIKA.”
28. For further information about Saleh al-‘Arouri, see the November 2023 ITIC report, “Profile of Saleh al-Arouri, a Senior Hamas Terrorist.”
29. For further information, see the January 2024 ITIC report, “Reactions to the killing of Saleh al-‘Arouri.”
30. For further information, see the December 2019 ITIC report, “Turkey as a Terrorism-Sponsoring State: Turkey allows Hamas to conduct terrorist activities from its territory, including the handling of terrorist squads in Judea and Samaria and the transfer of funds to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to finance terro.”
31. On December 13, 1992, Israeli Border Police officer Chief Superintendent Nissim Toledano was abducted in Lod by a Hamas terrorist squad. Hamas demanded the release of the movement’s leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in exchange for Toledano, who was ultimately murdered.
32. For further information, see the January 2025 ITIC report, “Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Document”
33. For further information, see the March 2022 ITIC report, “The British-based al-Hiwar TV provides a platform for Ibrahim al-Madhoun, a member of Hamas’ department of national relations, who operates from Turkey.”
34. On March 1, 1997, a suicide bombing was carried out at the Apropo Café in central Tel Aviv. Three women were killed and 48 people were injured. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.